Janusz Bugajski: RESOLVING THE KOSOVA-SERBIA DISPUTE

The ultimate goal of negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade are clear-cut for both sides. However, the steps to reach that goal remain problematic, the timetable is uncertain, and international commitments cannot be guaranteed.

Kosova has the clearest long-term objective in its talks with Belgrade, currently mediated by the European Union. It seeks recognition by all EU states and membership of key multi-national organizations, beginning with the United Nations. This is not a question of resolving Kosova’s “status,” as some Serbian politicians have claimed, but for all countries to acknowledge its final status as an independent state.

Serbia’s ultimate goals are also clear, as every politician knows that Kosova is lost territory that will not return under Belgrade’s control. The government campaigned on a pledge to join the EU and it has successfully started accession talks with Brussels. Belgrade does not want to be left behind Croatia or other neighbors in its economic development. However, at present it has no aspirations to join NATO even though this leaves the country more at Russia’s mercy and retards its military development.

In an ideal scenario, “normalization” would mean Belgrade formally recognizing Kosova as an independent state and establishing full diplomatic relations with Prishtina. But this is highly unlikely to happen any time soon, even if Serbia would immediately benefit from extensive international support for its constructive actions.

The easier bilateral deals over such things as license plates or property rights, arranged under the 2013 Brussels Agreement, have already been achieved and without tackling the most difficult problems Serb-Kosovar relations will come to a standstill.There was some hope a few months ago that a land swap between Belgrade and Prishtina could unblock normalization. Given the opposition of Germany and other EU members and the lackluster support from Washington, territorial exchange is not on the negotiating table, at least for the foreseeable future.

The only viable strategy remaining is for both sides to undertake a number of important steps toward each other that would be part of a “normalization package.” This would entail ending the current bilateral negatives and implementing several new positives.

For Prishtina, ending negatives would mean lifting the burdensome tariffs on Serbian goods and agreeing not to block visits by Serbian officials to northern Kosova if Prishtina is notified in advance. The positives can include reaffirming the importance of Serb Orthodox religious sites and even providing them a special status as internationally protected shrines. It could also mean implementing the agreement on the Association of Serb Municipalities while making sure this structurehas no centralized executive functions that would promote territorial autonomy.

For Serbia, ending negatives would entail honoring the Brussels agreement by unblocking any opposition to Kosova entering international institutions such as Interpolor the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It would also mean a halt to pursuing Kosova’sde-recognition among states that have already recognized – a policy Belgrade has adopted among small states in Oceania and elsewhereby offering financial assistance or other bribes.

The most important positive, short of outright recognition, would be for Serbia to drop its objections to Kosova gaining a seat in the UN General Assembly. Such a step by Belgrade would also demonstrate its independence from Russia, which has vetoed Kosova from entering the world body and uses its blockage to exert influence over Serbian policy making.

Simultaneously, Prishtina can declare that the progress made inthe “normalization package” should unblock Chapter 35 in Serbia’s accession agenda with the EU. This display of goodwill on both sides would hasten Belgrade’s progress toward meeting the criteria for Union entry.

Of course, there will be other obstacles to Serbia’s accession, as evident in the opposition of French President Emmanuel Macron to further enlargement before the EU conducts more intensive internal reforms. Nevertheless, Belgrade would win a legion of supporters within the Union if it finally settled its relations with Prishtina.

The US will need to be closely involved in the entire normalization process. It must seriously consider appointing a special envoy to demonstrate its determination to resolvea seemingly intractable dispute. It is not clear whether Presidents Thaci and Vucic could hammer out a “normalization package” on their own or even with EU mediation. The White House should urgently find a figuresimilar to Richard Holbrooke in the 1990s who will demonstratepersistence and creativity grounded in knowledge of the region.