IFIMES: Political elites living in a parallel reality

On 6 October 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina will hold its 8th local elections since the country declared independence in 1992. The elections will determine the mayors of municipalities and cities, as well as members of municipal and city councils and assemblies, across 143 local communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (111 municipalities, 32 cities, and the Brčko District BiH, as a separate administrative unit).

The number of registered voters stands at 3.4 million, which significantly exceeds the population of BiH.  A total of 110 political parties are participating in the elections, with 386 candidates running for mayoral positions. More than 25,700 candidates will compete for seats in local community councils. The estimated cost of the election is EUR 9.7 million. Of the 386 candidates for mayors in BiH, only 29 are women, making up just 7.5%.

Mayors of local communities are elected directly, except in three cities – Sarajevo, Mostar, and Brčko District BiH.

The international OSCE/ODIHR observation mission will monitor the local elections in BiH and will need to increase the number of observers due to the real risk of electoral manipulation and fraud.

In March this year, the High Representative in BiH, Christian Schmidt (EPP/CSU), imposed amendments to the Election Law, barring individuals convicted of war crimes from running as candidates, a change from previous practices. A candidate will only lose their mandate if they receive a final prison sentence exceeding six months; otherwise, there are no restrictions on participating in the election campaign. The OHR introduced innovations, such as ballot scanning for the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2026, but this will be limited to just 10% of polling stations, leaving 90% vulnerable to potential manipulation and fraud.

Furthermore, the imposed decision by the OHR stipulates that presidents and deputy presidents of electoral commissions must not be members of political parties.

Mayors are elected using a simple majority system (First-past-the-post), where the candidate with the highest number of votes wins without the need for a runoff election. This system is considered unacceptable in democratic societies as it undermines the legitimacy and authority of elected officials within the local community. Consequently, multi-party coalitions are common at the local level, as unified political or ethnic groups may form to prevent vote splitting among multiple candidates. Candidates for local community councils/assemblies are elected through proportional representation based on open lists, with the number of seats allocated according to the population of the local community.

Political parties have engaged in what is known as premature campaigning, which is punishable by fines ranging from 3,000 to 30,000 BAM (approximately 1,500 to 15,000 EUR), and have exploited public office and resources for campaign purposes. The Central Election Commission (CIK) has so far imposed only mild penalties on offenders.

Astonishingly, Irena Hadžiabdić’s term as a member of the Central Election Commission (CIK) expired over a year ago, yet she remains the President of the CIK and continues to oversee the electoral process. Hadžiabdić had the option to decline the role of CIK President. Her proposal to involve the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of BiH directly in the electoral process, particularly in the distribution of electoral materials, is unacceptable by democratic standards. This move aligns with Milorad Dodik‘s political agenda, as involving the Armed Forces in this manner undermines the integrity of the electoral process and discredits the Armed Forces as a vital state institution, with the ultimate aim of preventing the elections from taking place or of merging the local and parliamentary elections in 2026, thereby allowing certain parties to remain in power in local communities for an additional two years.

Analysts argue that it is crucial to scrutinize the family, kinship, and close personal ties of CIK President Irena Hadžiabdić and other CIK members with (key) political figures in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Behind the scenes, companies affiliated with SNSD (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats) and HDZBiH (Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina), which had previously handled ballot printing, did not apply for the contract this time. This appears to be an attempt to obstruct the election process and, consequently, the holding of the elections. Rather than ensuring the regularity, legality, and legitimacy of the local elections, High Representative Christian Schmidt has increasingly focused on lobbying for lithium mining in Lopare, neglecting the electoral process and tolerating the content of history textbooks in Republika Srpska elementary schools, which glorify convicted war criminals and the atrocities committed, including genocide. Schmidt’s actions are consistent with his career to date, as he has always seemed to follow the money.

The local elections in Sarajevo are specific because they involve four city municipalities where the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) experienced a major defeat in the last local elections, as well as in the subsequent indirect elections for the Sarajevo City Council and mayor. The most closely watched race will be in the Novo Sarajevo municipality, where the popular current mayor of Sarajevo, Benjamina Karić (SDP- Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina), running as the Troika’s candidate, will test her standing against Muamer Bandić (SBiH), the joint candidate of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH), the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Democratic Front (DF), and the People’s European Union (NES). In Sarajevo’s Centar municipality, the incumbent mayor and Troika candidate, Srđan Mandić (Our Party- NS), will face off against Dennis Gratz, the Democratic Front candidate supported by the SDA, DF, and SBiH. The election in Centar municipality could lead to a major rift within the People and Justice Party (NiP), as a significant part of NiP supports Dennis Gratz’s candidacy. In other Sarajevo municipalities, the current mayors are expected to retain their positions.

The City of Sarajevo is divided into four municipalities, which indirectly elect the Sarajevo City Council and the Mayor of Sarajevo.

The race for the mayor of Banja Luka, the second-largest city in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is highly uncertain. Incumbent Mayor Draško Stanivuković (PDP) will face Jelena Trivić (NF), a former party colleague, and Nikola Šobot, the candidate from Milorad Dodik’s SNSD. It is difficult to predict who will become the new mayor of Banja Luka. Analysts believe that Milorad Dodik is entering the local elections in Banja Luka with two candidates: Nikola Šobot and Draško Stanivuković. Besides Banja Luka, the elections in the municipality of Pale in Republika Srpska are also uncertain, where the DEMOS party, led by Nedeljko Čubrilović, has put forward a strong candidate against Dodik’s nominee despite his opposition. The municipality of Pale is of great interest to Dodik due to the significant financial stakes, as controlling the municipality also means managing the land on Mount Jahorina.

The local elections in Mostar will follow a mixed proportional representation system, where a total of 22 councillors will be elected from six different city districts and 13 councillors from a city-wide list. The mayor will be subsequently elected by the City Council. These elections will be the second in Mostar since the political agreement of 2020 and the first to be held concurrently with the rest of the country since 2008. The selection of the mayor will depend on the results of the City Council elections and subsequent coalition agreements.

Brčko, located in northeastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, has held a special status since 2000, when it was established as an autonomous district by the International Arbitration Commission, independent of the entities. The elections will directly elect the Assembly of Brčko District, which will then elect the mayor. The local elections are expected to bring change to the District, which has been stagnating for years due to obstructions from part of local authorities and neglect by previous supervisors, who were also deputies to the High Representative in BiH.

On the eve of the official start of the election campaign, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković (EPP/HDZ) visited Bosnia and Herzegovina and met with the Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers of BiH, Borjana Krišto (HDZBiH). Plenković’s visit was primarily promotional, as he mostly met with HDZBiH officials, and de facto “launched” the official election campaign for HDZBiH while avoiding a meeting with members of the BiH Presidency, which is constitutionally responsible for foreign policy.

The meeting Plenković – Krišto was essentially a gathering of the two HDZs. The grievances, complexities, and frustrations that Croatia and its officials harbour towards Bosnia and Herzegovina date back to 1994 and continue unabated. They are using this opportunity for a form of revenge, driven by the actions of High Representative Christian Schmidt (EPP/CSU), who has handed over the reins of power to them and transferred control of the Federation of BiH for their management. Croatia’s military efforts to seize part of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory failed, leading to its defeat and the subsequent dissolution of the so-called Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia (HR-HB). Their associated creation, the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia led by their puppet Fikret Abdić, was also defeated. Ultimately, these efforts resulted in convictions at The Hague (ICTY) for joint criminal enterprises and participation in the international armed conflict (aggression) of Croatia against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the failure of their attempt to establish a Greater Croatia, with the main proponents of that project convicted as war criminals by ICTY, there is now a renewed effort to mount a similar assault on Bosnia and Herzegovina and its largest ethnic group, the Bosniaks, thirty years after the collapse of HR-HB. This represents a classic form of retribution, with the belief that after 30 years they can restore HR-HB with a pencil in hand, relying on current partners who enable such actions, notably High Representative Christian Schmidt and the Troika parties (SDP, NiP, and NS). Consequently, great caution is warranted regarding Croatia’s interference in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Analysts believe that Croatia has achieved only two notable successes in its efforts towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first was the appointment of HDZ party ally Christian Schmidt as High Representative in BiH, facilitated by radical right-wing circles in Europe and the European People’s Party (EPP). The second was the installation of the Troika parties (SDP, NiP, and NS), which, through their subservient stance, handed over the Federation of BiH to Zagreb. Notably, Christian Schmidt, as a protégé of European right-wing criminal networks, faced a debacle even before arriving in BiH, and the Troika parties suffered defeats in the elections.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is characterised by a “party paradox,” where voters hold a strong disdain for political parties and politicians whom they trust little or not at all. Despite this, these parties are perceived as the most attractive means for advancing personal interests or pursuing successful careers. Consequently, local elections are viewed as a form of party spoils. There is a marked lack of critical engagement or opinion. Instead of focusing on urgent local issues that affect residents—who rely on their local communities for over 75% of their needs—political parties and local candidates often concentrate on grandiose topics.

Following the 2022 parliamentary elections, High Representative Christian Schmidt and several foreign embassies “installed” a new government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, comprised of the Troika (SDP, NiP, and NS), SNSD, and HDZBiH.

Analysts argue that the upcoming local elections transcend their usual scope and represent a critical test for the Troika, SNSD, and HDZBiH. Voters will have the chance to evaluate their performance, provided they can make choices independently and without external pressures. However, substantial amounts of both public and questionable funds have been funnelled into the electoral process, potentially influencing the final results. Analysts believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political elites live in a parallel reality, that voters have not yet effectively challenged in past elections.