Janusz Bugajski: PUTIN UNDER THREAT
Although President Vladimir Putin is preparing to maintain power beyond his current mandate, due to end in 2024, he faces unprecedented challenges that can lead to Russia’s implosion. With economic, social, and regional challenges escalating Putin’s self-proclaimed “power vertical” looks increasingly shaky.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, all Russian governments have failed to modernize the state, whether through a European model of a democratic market economy or a Chinese model of state-directed capitalism. Instead, Russia has become a neo-fascist kleptocracy in which political freedoms are extinguished and the chasm between a corrupt oligarchy and the masses has become unbridgeable.
In Marxist terminology, once espoused by Soviet’s propagandists, Russia is heading toward a revolutionary situation where the “forces of production” are in stark contradiction with the “relations of production.” In other words, the ruling elite is facing growing public opposition and potential revolt.
Putinism is a system that not only spreads disinformation against Western adversaries, but above all it lies about itself. Each definition used by officials to describe the country is based on a falsehood. Russia is not a real federation, as its diverse regions have no say in their development. And it is not a “sovereign democracy,” as there is no public input into policy making. As the economy nosedives, the conflict between state and citizens is heading toward conflict, as the safety valves for peaceful public opposition have been removed.
Several recent policy moves are pushing the populace toward revolt and Putin’s approval rating is plummeting, even according to official statistics. Moscow has implemented an extremely unpopular increase in the retirement age that has reduced state-paid pensions. This squeeze on family incomes is compounded by rising taxes, deteriorating communal services, and increasing consumer prices.
Moscow has also angered numerous ethnic groups through its new language policy. This involves curtailing non-Russian languages and indigenous institutions. Border changes between federal republics, intended to reward Kremlin loyalists, have also sparked mass protests in Ingushetia and could spread to other North Caucasus republics where anger with Moscow and its local governors is on the rise.
In recent anti-government unrest, protests are mounting against the dumping of garbage from large cities in rural areas. Massive open-air landfills often located near residential areas exacerbate health problems and destroy the local environment. Thousands of people have ignored police bans and marched against planned new landfills near Moscow and in several regions of Siberia and the far north.
The litany of regional and local protests is growing and without public accountability the Kremlin looks determined toimpose traditional Soviet methods of mass repression.The regime cannot reform itself, as any democratic openings and regional pluralism would threaten the foundations of the Putinist system.To shield itself from organized public unrest mobilized through the spread of truthful information, the regime is imposing new restrictions on access to the internet for ordinary citizens.
Putin foresaw the prospect of public protests asearly as 2016, when Moscow established the “Russian Guard” – an internal force directly answerable to the President. It can be deployed to protect the Kremlin leader from any attempt to remove him. The National Guard numbers about 340,000 paramilitary personnel distributed across Russia.As Putin’s personal bodyguard, similar to Hitler’s SS, its mandate includes “protecting public order and guarding important state facilities.”
To distract from his failures, Putin can also engage in new foreign adventures. But this is increasingly backfiring against him, as a growing number of people understand that the campaign to “make Russia great again” consists mostly of smoke and mirrors. The mirage of greatness brings no benefits but further impoverishes the citizens whose living standards decline as Moscow spends the dwindling Russian budget on proxy wars outside its borders.
With his own three consecutive terms in office officially expiring in 2024 Putin could either violate the constitution to remain in power or create a new position for ruling Russia. A union between Russia and Belarus could be his option, similarly to Slobodan Milosevic in the 1990s who maintained the relic of a two member federal Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to rotate his power. By absorbing Belarus the Kremlin could claim a new state has been created and Putin would become the President through fraudulent elections. Rumors of a coup plot in Belarus may be the beginning of such a scenario.