Cafo Boga: Albania-Kosova, one nation, two states
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ALBANIA AND KOSOVA: ONE NATION, TWO STATES
Relations between Albania and Kosova are too often framed between declarations of national unity and warnings about a so-called “Greater Albania.” This article argues for a more practical approach: examining how two sovereign states, sharing the same national heritage and many strategic interests, can cooperate far more closely without surrendering their sovereignty.The article proposes consideration of a bilateral mutual-defense agreement, deeper military coordination, a more appropriate name for the Kosovo Security Force as it evolves into a military defense force, and freer movement of citizens across the Albania–Kosova border. It also examines how these objectives could fit within NATO, EU and Schengen frameworks.The immediate goal should not be political unification, but deeper strategic integration—making Albania and Kosova stronger, safer, freer and more economically connected. At the same time, peaceful national unification should not be treated as inherently illegitimate or forbidden from public discussion. If future generations freely and democratically choose to pursue it, within constitutional and international law, that decision should belong to them.The principle is simple: One nation. Two states. One strategic purpose.
ALBANIA AND KOSOVA: ONE NATION, TWO STATES
Why Tirana and Prishtina should think more boldly about defense, security, free movement—and their long-term relationship
By Cafo Boga, M.A. in Diplomacy – October 18, 2026
For years, relations between Albania and Kosova have too often been discussed between two extremes: declarations of national unity on one side and warnings about “Greater Albania” on the other.
The expression “Greater Albania” deserves clarification. It is not the terminology Albanians traditionally used to describe their national aspirations. Rather, it became an external political label—particularly prominent in Serbian and Yugoslav political discourse—and has often been used to portray Albanian national integration as territorial expansionism. Albanian discourse has instead used terms such as Shqipëria Etnike (Ethnic Albania), Ribashkimi Kombëtar (National Reunification) and, more recently, Shqipëria Natyrale (Natural Albania), notably promoted by Koço Danaj.
But this article proposes none of those broader territorial concepts. It asks a narrower and more practical question:
How closely can Albania and Kosova—two sovereign states—legally and peacefully cooperate in pursuit of their common national and strategic interests?
The answer may be: considerably more than many assume.
TWO STATES, ONE STRATEGIC INTEREST
Albania and Kosova are independent states with separate constitutions, governments and international responsibilities. A closer strategic relationship need not change that reality.
Countries throughout the world cooperate on defense, security, trade and free movement without surrendering sovereignty. Albania and Kosova already cooperate extensively, but cooperation is not the same as having a coherent long-term strategy.
Defense is one place to begin.
WHY NOT A MUTUAL-DEFENSE AGREEMENT?
Albania is a member of NATO. Kosova is not. Yet there appears to be no general rule of international law preventing them from negotiating a bilateral defense agreement, provided Albania’s commitments remain compatible with its NATO obligations.
Its central principle could be simple:
An armed attack against either Albania or Kosova would be regarded as a threat to the security of both.
This would not extend NATO’s Article 5 guarantee to Kosova; Albania cannot unilaterally do that. But Albania and Kosova can determine the obligations they assume toward each other.
They already cooperate militarily, and Albania, Kosova and Croatia signed a Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation in 2025. It strengthens cooperation but creates no mutual-defense obligation.
Why should Tirana and Prishtina not examine whether a formal bilateral defense and security agreement should be the next step?
WHAT SHOULD KOSOVA CALL ITS MILITARY?
Albania officially has the Forcat e Armatosura të Republikës së Shqipërisë (Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania). Kosova still has the Forca e Sigurisë së Kosovës (Kosovo Security Force—FSK), although it is being transformed into a military defense force.
There is no European rule prescribing what a country’s military must be called. Serbia uses Vojska Srbije (Serbian Armed Forces) and Montenegro Vojska Crne Gore (Armed Forces of Montenegro). Albania itself once used Ushtria Popullore (People’s Army).
The name “Kosovo Security Force” therefore reflects Kosova’s particular constitutional and political history—not a prohibition against Ushtria e Kosovës (Army of Kosova) or Forcat e Armatosura të Kosovës (Armed Forces of Kosova).
If the FSK is becoming the force responsible for defending the country, perhaps it has outgrown the name under which it was created.
WHY SHOULD CITIZENS STILL STOP AT THE BORDER?
Abolishing an international border is one thing. Eliminating routine border checks for citizens of Albania and Kosova is another.
Why should their citizens undergo the same routine procedures as foreign visitors when crossing their common border?
The two governments could examine a bilateral free-movement arrangement allowing their citizens to cross with minimal—or eventually no routine—identity inspection, while retaining customs, security mechanisms and controls for third-country nationals.
The objective would not be to erase two states, but to make the border increasingly irrelevant in the everyday lives of their citizens.
Albania’s European path must, of course, be considered. It must accept the Schengen acquis as part of EU accession, although full participation in the border-free Schengen Area follows a separate process. If Albania entered Schengen while Kosova remained outside, their common border would become a Schengen external frontier, complicating a bilateral arrangement.
That gives Kosova another strategic reason to pursue integration into the same European free-movement and security architecture. If both eventually participated fully in that system, routine controls between them could disappear within a broader European framework.
INTEGRATION NOW—THE FUTURE REMAINS OPEN
Albania and Kosova can remain two sovereign states while pursuing deeper defense cooperation, coordinated military planning, joint procurement and training, economic integration, freer movement, common infrastructure and closer European and Euro-Atlantic coordination.
None of this requires changing borders—at least for now.
Nor should peaceful national unification be considered inherently illegitimate or dangerous even to discuss.
Albanians in Albania and Kosova are historically part of the same nation, whose territories were placed within different states following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Balkan Wars and decisions of the European Great Powers in the early twentieth century.
There is therefore nothing inherently wrong with including peaceful national unification among their possible long-term strategic objectives—provided any such process is democratic, reflects the freely expressed will of their citizens, follows constitutional procedures and respects international law.
History provides precedents. Germany is perhaps the clearest modern European example: two internationally recognized German states peacefully became one country in 1990 through democratic decisions, negotiation and international agreement. The circumstances are different, but the principle remains relevant: political arrangements inherited by one generation need not necessarily bind every generation that follows.
That does not mean unification should be today’s objective.
Today’s objective should be practical: make Albania and Kosova stronger, safer, freer and more integrated, while advancing their European and Euro-Atlantic future.
Tirana and Prishtina should establish a high-level joint commission to examine what can legally and practically be achieved in defense, security, free movement, economic cooperation and strategic infrastructure. Some measures may require constitutional changes or consultation with NATO and European partners. That is reason to study them carefully—not to avoid the discussion.
Such cooperation would not threaten peace in the Western Balkans. Properly constructed within European and international frameworks, it should strengthen it.
Albania and Kosova share language, history, culture, families, economic interests and security concerns. Geography has already made them strategic partners. Their governments should now turn that reality into a coherent strategy.
And if future generations someday decide democratically that the relationship should go further, that decision should belong to them.
For now, the principle is simple:
One nation. Two states. One strategic purpose.
